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█ Riassunto  Dal sé minimo al sé come segno iper-generalizzato. Note per un modello integrato di soggettività – 
Il presente articolo propone una prospettiva teorica di tipo fenomenologico e intende mostrare che 
l’intersoggettività e le sue dinamiche di costituzione di senso sono coerenti con una vision emergentista del sé 
personale. In particolare, questo studio propone un modello semiotico di mente e una concezione correlata del 
sé come “segno iper-generalizzato”. Il punto di partenza di questa analisi poggia sui modelli proposti dalla ricer-
ca fenomenologica, cognitiva e da quella ispirata dalla teoria dell’enazione, che distinguono tra una coscienza 
pre-reflessiva e un sé non concettuale proprio del corpo vissuto. Il presente studio mira a proporre un singolo 
costrutto non-ipostatizzato di tipo psicologico e psicodinamico capace di ricomprendere e integrare tutte quelle 
proprietà intersoggettive della cognizione che sono oggi oggetto d’indagine della ricerca fenomenologica sulle 
varie tipologie di sé (sé minimo; sé pre-riflessivo; sé non-concettuale; sé ecologico; sé esteso), le quali vengono 
anche indagate nelle scienze cognitive da coloro che seguono l’approccio incarnato e situato. 
PAROLE CHIAVE: Sé minimo; Sé pre-riflessivo; Sé non-concettuale; Sé ecologico; Sé esteso. 
 
█ Abstract  This paper proposes a phenomenologically oriented theoretical perspective and it aims at show-
ing that intersubjectivity and its dynamics of sense-making are consistent with an emergentist view of the 
personal Self. In particular, this paper proposes a semiotic model of mind and a correlated conception of the 
Self as a “hyper-generalized sign”. The starting point for this analysis is based on models emerging from 
phenomenological, cognitive and enactive research which differentiate between pre-reflective consciousness 
and a non-conceptual Self of the living body. The paper will try to develop a single non-hypostatised con-
struct of a psychological and psychodynamic kind that includes and integrates all those intersubjective fea-
tures of cognition addressed by phenomenological research on the various forms of the Self (the minimal 
Self; the pre-reflective Self; the non-conceptual Self; the ecological Self; the extended Self) which are also an 
object of study for embodied and situated approaches in the cognitive sciences. 
KEYWORDS: Minimal Self; Pre-reflective Self; Non-conceptual Self; Ecological Self; Extended Self. 
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IN A GENERAL OVERVIEW OF CURRENT cog-
nitive science we immediately notice that mod-
els of mental life develop along two major inter-
twined directions.  
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On the one hand, in the wake of a growing 
interest in biology that is not reduced to a mere 
neuroscientific investigation of the brain, we 
see increasing emphasis on the involvement of 
the body (embodied cognition) in its totality, in 
its practical complexity and its phenomenolog-
ical (material-objective and subjective) duality.  
On the other hand, we witness an increas-
ingly broad ecological form characterizing 
mental models, namely a situated study of the 
agents whose cognitive activity, in order to be 
adequately understood, must be seen in an en-
vironmental context, a background of behav-
ioural patterns, a scenario of varied interac-
tions, socially structured and shared, within 
which the subject operates.1  
This two-pronged exploration, which helps 
overall to restructure our understanding of 
mind and cognition, is naturally full of meth-
odological and epistemological implications 
which involve the most challenging topics in 
cognitive science such as the study of subjective 
consciousness, personal identity and Self.  
In these areas it is clearly necessary to coor-
dinate the interwoven drives entailed by em-
bodied and situated models of cognition, which 
result in the need to reconstruct the multiple 
dimensions and different levels of scientific re-
search in an integrated and complex view of 
mind and Self, seeking a cognitive-operational 
model whose epistemological sense can be ex-
pressed by Morin’s words: 
 
complexus means that which is woven to-
gether. In fact there is complexity whenever 
the various elements […] that compose a 
whole are inseparable, and there is inter-
retroactive, interactive, interdependent tis-
sue between the subject of knowledge and 
its context, the parts and the whole, the 
whole and the parts, the parts amongst 
themselves. Complexity is therefore the 
bond between unity and multiplicity.2  
 
In order to focus on the need for a model 
that can adequately capture the different as-
pects of research into the Self,3 we believe it is 
worth starting from an exploration of enactive-
phenomenological research into the minimal, 
corporeal and ecological levels of Self; from 
there a line of argumentation will develop 
demonstrating that in order to reach an under-
standing of a fully specified cognitive agent – 
fully compliant, as we will see, with these same 
models of pre-reflexive Self – the Self must be 
studied in the context of its social, pragmatic-
interactive and linguistic background.  
 
█ The emergence of minimal Self 
 
For the sake of our discussion, it is worth 
starting from Haselager, Broens and Quilici 
Gonzalez’s  model of the emergence of the min-
imal Self.4  
The Authors’ remarks summarize the status 
quaestionis very well and get to the crux of the 
complex, heated interdisciplinary debate about 
personal identity and the Self as it has been de-
veloping through contrasts between cognitive 
neuroscience, the embodied cognitive sciences 
and the naturalized phenomenological investi-
gation of experience.  
The Authors in fact take a radically embod-
ied cognitive and experiential approach in 
which the lived body,5 in its biological integrity, 
in its unavoidable structural complexity and its 
experiential dimension – and not just the brain 
or nervous system abstractly considered in their 
autonomy from the living organism and the 
environment – is totally involved in the prima-
ry constitutive dynamics of the emergence of a 
minimal sense of identity. 
The roots of a minimal sense of Self must 
therefore be located, according to the Authors, 
not in the brain itself6 but in the global embod-
ied dynamics of the body itself experienced in 
the concrete environment.  
The body is understood here not just as a 
body-object (Körper) but, in the tradition of 
phenomenological studies, as an animated, sen-
tient system structuring and enactivating a field 
of experience and, at the same time, taking pos-
session of its dynamic possibilities starting 
from the basic experience of movement. 
Following especially the insights of the 
Sheets-Johnstone enactive-phenomenological 
From Minimal Self to Self as Hyper-generalized Sign 
 
15 
approach whereby «we do not come into the 
world embodied. We come into the world mov-
ing»,7 the Authors dwell on the primary role of 
proprioceptive mechanisms and the kinaes-
thetic experiences of the lived biological body 
which, through proprioceptive/exteroreceptive 
feeling, co-determine – in the style of Gibson – 
the environment it is correlated to, contextually 
specifying and storing a nuclear, minimal, eco-
logical sense of the Self,8 which is expressed at 
first in spontaneous movement (I move) and 
then in voluntary movement (I can move): 
 
having an identity is having the capacity to 
have “I”-experiences. However, these “I”-
experiences need not require linguistic or 
conceptual capacities. […] the moving body 
provides for a minimal Self (at times also 
called a nonconceptual or “ecological” Self 
[…]) that is more basic than the reflexive, 
conceptualised, consciously experienced 
Self that is the primary focus of philosophy 
and most of cognitive science.9  
 
In its most primitive and fundamental form, 
self-consciousness consists, for the phenomeno-
logical-cognitive perspective, merely in the con-
stant first-person manifestation of experience.10  
Such pre-reflective self-consciousness – typ-
ical of every subjective experience – is closely 
related to the embodied corporeal character 
that specifies how concrete biological and 
agents can establish a perspective and situated 
connection with a world and co-specify experi-
ence itself.  
The first unfolding consciousness in body 
movement through proprioceptive, sensorimo-
tor structure and kinaesthetic experience, is 
neither a kind of objectual consciousness (not a 
perception of the body as an object) nor a me-
ta-cognitive consciousness, but rather the orig-
inal way in which  consciousness as embodied 
consciousness constitutes itself: 
 
primarily, my body is experienced, not as an 
object, but as a field of activity and affectivi-
ty, as a potentiality of mobility and volition, 
as an “I do” and “I can”.11  
Legrand summed up this matter effectively in 
this way: «by definition, the body-as-subject is 
itself absent-as-intentional-object».12 The mini-
mal sense of identity is therefore to be intended in 
an ecological sense, embodied-situated, connect-
ed to the lived body seen as the vehicle of our be-
ing in the world,13 the zero-point around which 
experience itself is organized according to the tra-
ditional phenomenological approach: 
 
kinaesthetic activation during perception 
produces an implicit and pervasive refer-
ence to one’s own body. This is the basis for 
a bodily self-awareness that contributes to 
organizing perception. The implicit self-
awareness of the actual and possible move-
ments of my body helps shape the experi-
ence that I have of the world. To be clear, 
however, bodily self-awareness is not an 
awareness of the body in isolation from the 
world; it is embedded in action and percep-
tion. We do not first become aware of the 
body and subsequently use it to engage with 
the world. We experience the world bodily, 
and the body is revealed to us in our explo-
ration of the world. Primarily, the body at-
tains self-awareness in action (or in our dis-
positions to action, or in our action possibil-
ities) when it relates to something, uses 
something, or moves through the world.14  
 
█ From minimal Self to extended Self 
 
As Mead showed in his classic social-
psychological research:  
 
until the rise of his self-consciousness in the 
process of social experience, the individual 
experiences his body – its feelings and sen-
sations – merely as an immediate part of his 
environment, not as his own, not in terms of 
self-consciousness. The Self and self-
consciousness have first to arise, and then 
these experiences can be identified peculiarly 
with the Self, or appropriated by the Self.15  
 
Before the subject of experience perceives 
himself and we can therefore talk about the 
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possibility of a reflexive self-consciousness – be-
longing to the personal, relational, social and in-
ter-subjective area – in the pre-reflexive experi-
ential dimension there must exist for the phe-
nomenologist «a certain whole […] something 
that is already structured» that «in the next re-
flection […] I can, indeed I must find it».16 
Moreover, as an Italian phenomenologist wrote:  
 
it is possible that a very young child or an 
animal doesn’t have a self-consciousness, 
and isn’t able to say “I”. And yet it is part of 
their immediate (unreflected) experience to 
be a central reference point.. This “I” as a 
center precedes self-consciousness and self-
awareness and even the practical under-
standing of meanings. It’s an original I, an 
element that can be conceived independently 
of the inter-subjective relation. If we wanted 
to use the term nuclear consciousness, we 
would use it only in this context.17 
 
Husserl states in this regard: «self-
perception is a reflection […] and it presupposes 
in essence an unreflected consciousness»,18 and 
elsewhere: 
 
when I say I, I grasp myself in a simple reflec-
tion. But this self-experience [Selbster-
fahrung] is like every experience [Erfahrung], 
and in particular every perception, a mere di-
recting myself towards something that was 
already there for me, that was already con-
scious, but not thematically experienced, not 
noticed.19 
 
Therefore, if the «I that is established in re-
flection leads to another I»,20 such a reference 
makes it convenient for Husserl – similar to 
James’ distinctions (1890) – to distinguish be-
tween:  
 
I that I am” from the subject side and “I that 
I am” as obiectum for me, which is repre-
sented, formed, specifically intended in I-
am: the Me [das Mich]. Here this means 
“the person” made for me, the I, that is pre-
sent in consciousness as the Self.21 
The psychological subject (the person, in 
these distinctions by Husserl) doesn’t emerge 
in a solipsistic way: the self-conscious subject – 
the Self in the sense of extended conscious-
ness22 – is in fact intrinsically social for the 
phenomenologist too. Husserl himself clarifies 
it unequivocally: 
 
according to our expositions the concepts I-
we are relative: the I requires the You, the 
We, the “Other”. Besides, the I (the I as per-
son) requires the relation to a world of 
things. Therefore, I, we, the world belong 
together.23  
 
Reflexive subjective consciousness thus im-
plies initially sociality, interaction with others, 
language, culture, history and indeed, we can 
now say, it is the embodied nature of con-
sciousness itself which reveals some specific 
ways to develop these implications and indica-
tions: 
 
embodiment brings intersubjectivity and 
sociality into the picture, and draws atten-
tion to the question of how certain forms of 
self-consciousness are intersubjectively me-
diated, and may depend on one’s social rela-
tions to others.24  
 
First, in fact, it is only the concrete experi-
ence of the other which in terms of the real 
genesis of the subject, makes reflexivity possi-
ble, that is the decentralization from one’s body 
and ascribing intentional attitudes, an ego to the 
alter’s ego: «when this happens the child isn’t his 
own body anymore: he has a body».25  
Secondly – from an even more general 
point of view or phenomenological perspective 
on  the subject – this self-reflexivity emerges by 
sharing an interactive dynamics in the common 
world where he empathically meets others and 
learns to relate reflexively to him/herself.26  
The extended Self emerges in relation to a 
world of real inter-subjective practices, a limit 
to the links between possible actions that ap-
pear to the subject as the real meanings of 
things:  
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understanding what are used to make ob-
jects, the child may experience as “meaning-
ful” the behaviors of others, and therefore 
ascribe a mind to the other […] then the ob-
jects become social objects, provided with a 
public meaning, common and inter-
subjective, that is, symbols mediating the 
understanding of intentions of others.27  
 
Only insofar as the subject can access a pro-
spect of meanings – encountered in the world 
and inter-subjectively presented as the practice 
with objects – and make them his own, thus 
opening up to a cultural world, can he become a 
proper personal identity, an I open to the pos-
sible, to temporality, reflexively able to look at 
Self as another28 and empathically related to 
others in the sense of intentional subjects who 
have before them the same confines of practical 
references grasped by the subject, and the same 
meanings. 
In order to develop the reflective and self-
conscious Self – and develop a proper sense of 
personal identity – social interaction broadly 
speaking (both in its bodily aspects and in its 
specific symbolic-linguistic and socio-cultural 
inter-subjective praxis) is thus an essential con-
dition.29 As Mead argued: «the physiological 
conception or theory of consciousness is by it-
self inadequate; it requires supplementation 
from the socio-psychological point of view».30  
 
█ The Self as hyper-generalized sign 
 
The personal identity of the psychological 
subject, whose minimal, pre-conceptual and eco-
logical features are rooted – as Haselager, 
Broens and Quilici Gonzalez emphasized – in 
the dynamic possibilities of the lived body, also 
displays in an original and ineluctable way the 
mark of sociality, and its emergence is connected 
phenomenologically to the inter-subjective,31 
practical and pragmatic dynamics of the con-
struction of meaning and the use of signs: 
 
we’re related to a common surrounding 
world [gemeinsame Umwelt] – we are in a 
society of persons: both things belong to-
gether. We could not be persons for others 
if we had not in front of us, in the common-
ality and intentional connectedness of our 
life, a common surrounding world; in cor-
relative terms: one thing constitutes itself 
essentially with the other.32 
 
The personal mind emerges therefore in re-
lation to inter-subjectively generated and 
shared meanings and in their symbolic under-
standing involving otherness; the extended Self 
– the self-conscious subject – is manifested in 
the possibilities of action it encounters in the 
interactive dimension, trying out the social 
rules involved in using signs and taking part in 
language games generating the sense of experi-
ence,33 thus opening up to symbolic expression 
of thought, both in communicative form as in 
the derived form of inner monologue or talking 
to myself.34 
 
My awareness of myself as one person 
among others, an awareness that I may 
frame from the perspective of others, at-
tempting to see myself as they see me, in-
volves a change in the attitude of self-
consciousness. Within this attitude, judg-
ments that I make about myself are con-
strained by social expectations and cultural 
values. This kind of social self-consciousness 
is always contextualized, as I try to under-
stand how I appear to others, both in the way 
I look, and in the meaning of my actions. I 
find myself in specific contexts, with specific 
capabilities and dispositions, habits and con-
victions, and I express myself in a way that is 
reflected off of others, in relevant (socially 
defined) roles through my language and my 
actions.35  
 
If the Self – according to enactive and 
phenomenological approaches – is involved 
from the beginning in a dynamic of sense-
making within which it is grasped correlative-
ly as reflective consciousness, taking part, in 
semiotic-pragmatic terms, in the common lin-
guistic games which specify the rise of mean-
ings themselves, then its process of emergence 
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should be explored through a psychological 
model in which basic, embodied and higher 
processes do not picture separate worlds, but 
polarities of a whole dialectics. 
Such a model must consider the mind as a 
system working through and/or on meanings, 
where every meaning – in line with what is 
stated above and in close relation to Wittgen-
stein36  and Peirce’s theories of sign and mean-
ing37  – must be approached as the product, ra-
ther than the cause, of sense-making, and 
therefore brought back onto a level of pragmat-
ic, contextual, dialogical semiotics – namely a 
semiotics which no longer considers meaning 
as existing before sense-making (i.e. the use of 
the sign; language-games, in Wittgenstein’s 
terminology), but as emerging from it. 
This semiotic view of the mind, viewing psy-
chological processes in terms of a dynamics of 
signs, exploring the micro-dynamics of sense-
making through which meaning processes 
emerge and which mechanisms instantiate such 
processes, provides a general model of the con-
stitution of signs, namely – in Peircean terms – 
the process through which a brute state of the 
world experienced in itself (Firstness) acquires 
the semiotic status of something standing for 
something else (Thirdness).38 
According to this view Identity is not at all 
an entity. We generally think of identity as an 
entity whose more or less invariant and homo-
geneous properties and qualities affect – regu-
late, motivate, constrain – the psyche: we have 
an identity, just as we have an arm or a car; we 
feel, think, behave, choose according to how 
such an entity is and works.  
The basic background of this view is the as-
sumption that invariance and variability are 
linked by a relationship of conflictual opposi-
tion: identity is what is equal to itself – the nu-
cleon of invariance which remains so despite 
the changing of all the rest.  
This leads us to consider the relation be-
tween the person and the world in terms of two 
general kinds of fields: those that allow the 
identity to reproduce through time and space 
and those that hinder such reproduction, which 
are therefore experienced in terms of conflict, 
frustration, suffering, alienation – in sum: as 
events that threaten the stability of the identity.  
However, there is another way of seeing 
identity too – namely, as hyper-generalized sign 
playing a basic regulative function in the dy-
namics of sense-making itself.39 This basic 
function allows sense-making to reproduce 
through time, and so to generate the global 
sense of the stability of the intra-personal and 
inter-personal exchange of signs that we usually 
understand as “identity”.40   
These kinds of signs in fact regulate sense-
making, using a process of abstractive generali-
zation,41 in order to connect lower-order signs 
with each other and thus guarantee stability to 
the semiotic flow.42  
Now, the greater the distance between two 
signs (i.e. the lower the plausibility of their as-
sociation), the greater the level of generaliza-
tion required to keep the sense of continuity 
between them. For instance, consider two feel-
ings, say shame (A) and anxiety (B). The per-
son experiences them as similar and connected, 
given that their association has a high probabil-
ity of occurring (i.e. there are many situations 
in which they tend to occur together).  
Therefore, the association A<>B will imply 
a low level of abstractive generalization – for 
instance simply one consisting of a reference to 
a specific indicator which is common to the sit-
uations in which A<>B occurs (e.g. the embod-
ied state associated with these feelings).  
Consider now a situation in which the two 
feelings are very different from each other – 
say sadness (A’) and happiness (B’). In this 
case the person experiencing A’<>B’ has to 
activate a higher level of abstractive generali-
zation, in order to keep the sense of the conti-
nuity of the semiotic flow, and therefore of the 
sense of Self. For instance, the person might 
think/say: “I am very variable in my affect to-
day”, or “What does it mean that I experience 
such contrasting feelings: maybe I have to 
consult a psychologist”, or “What the hell did I 
eat yesterday”.  
Identity as hyper-generalized sign is thus 
triggered each time a level of abstraction asso-
ciated with it is required for regulating the dis-
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tance between semiotic signs. And this means 
that the greater the variability of the sense-
making, the higher the probability that identity 
will emerge as regulative signs. In other words, 
a person can succeed in integrating some very 
different experiences – and in so doing can 
keep a sense of the continuity of the Self – only 
if she interprets them in terms of “these events 
are what-I-am-experiencing – they are part of 
the sane field because I am always the same”. 
Identity must be understood as emergence 
from diversification, as the way of regulating 
the latter – rather than as resulting from the 
conflict between a stable Self and a de-
stabilizing world.  
In sum, according to the semiotic model of 
mind, stability of sense-making can lastly be 
interpreted as the micro-dynamic correlate of 
minimal or nuclear and pre-reflective Self. Ap-
proaching the stability of semiotic process over 
time as the dynamic source of nuclear Self and 
the latter as a product of sense-making, the Self 
as a hyper-generalized sign model provides for 
an integrated and continuous explanatory pat-
tern of extended and reflective consciousness.  
In fact, such a dynamic-semiotic model 
avoids every hypostatic prerequisite and allows 
us to look at the nuclear Self – regarded by 
phenomenological research, as we have seen, as 
a logical and intrinsic necessity to explain sub-
jectivity – not as an entity but as a process 
strictly connected with the embodied and situ-
ated general semiotic dynamic of the emer-
gence of personal identity itself. 
 
█ Conclusions 
 
Scientific, philosophical and psychological 
research explores, as we have seen, many valid 
constructs of the Self to investigate the various 
interconnected aspects and multiple dimen-
sions constituting the complexity of the con-
scious mind of the personal subject in its vari-
ous phenomenologically and cognitively related 
extensions.  
Moreover, as we observed, if personal iden-
tity is properly attributed to the same process 
of meaning creation in which we grasp our-
selves as subjects – that is embodied self-
conscious minds in an inter-subjective world of 
meanings and other subjects – it must emerge, 
in its regulative and stabilizing function, as a 
product of the same overall general dynamic of 
sense-making.  
This integrates the trend of phenomeno-
logical analysis with the models of embodied 
and situated cognitive investigation of the Self 
that we have explored in this study. Reducing 
an explanation of subjective consciousness to 
a single dimension would not only preclude an 
understanding of the dynamic, integrated, 
global and continuous semiotic process which 
must frame the very emergence of the self-
conscious mind, but would also prevent us 
from grasping the procedural, pragmatic-
semiotic and non-reifiable nature of the Self.  
Approaching the Self psychologically as a 
hyper-generalized sign could allow us, as we 
have suggested, to integrate multiple levels and 
dimensions (bodily, situated, embodied, expe-
riential, intersubjective, social-pragmatic and 
linguistic) in a complex dynamic model of iden-
tity that can incorporate some phenomenologi-
cal, enactive and social-psychological analysis 
of the minimal and extended Self without em-
phasizing partial divisions and subsequent hy-
postatisation of some unilaterally considered 
dimension. As Francisco Varela stated in this 
regard: 
 
not only in childhood, but throughout the 
rest of existence, life, mental life, the life of 
consciousness, the life of language or the 
mediated life of language, the whole cycle of 
empathic socially mediated interaction, I 
cannot separate from what we call con-
sciousness. So once again it is not inside my 
head that all this takes place, but in a decen-
tralized way [excentré], in the cycle. The 
problem of the neuronal correlates of con-
sciousness is misplaced, because conscious-
ness is not in the head. In short, conscious-
ness is an emergence requiring the existence 
of these three phenomena, of these three 
cycles: with the body, with the world and 
with others.43 
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